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Could foreign policy actually affect the presidential election? . 4 Online Dating Sites that Actually Work for FreeTop US Dating Sites. Romney won whites by 20 percentage points in (59% to 39%). (For more analysis of the exit polls, see “Hillary Clinton wins The gender gap in presidential vote preference is among the widest in exit polls dating back to accessible through the websites of NEP member organizations. How President Obama's campaign used big data to rally individual voters. site traffic, personalize content, and serve targeted advertisements.
Sending volunteers to persuade voters would mean forcing them to interact with opponents, or with voters who were undecided because they were alienated from politics on delicate issues like abortion. They began sending trained volunteers to knock on doors or make phone calls with the objective of changing minds. That dramatic shift in the culture of electioneering was felt on the streets, but it was possible only because of advances in analytics.
How Obama’s Team Used Big Data to Rally Voters
Likely Obama supporters would get regular reminders from their local field organizers, asking them to return their ballots, and, once they had, a message thanking them and proposing other ways to be involved in the campaign.
The local organizer would receive daily lists of the voters on his or her turf who had outstanding ballots so that the campaign could follow up with personal contact by phone or at the doorstep. Wagner, however, was turning his attention beyond the field. Throughout the primaries, Romney had appeared to be the only Republican running a 21st-century campaign, methodically banking early votes in states like Florida and Ohio before his disorganized opponents could establish operations there.
Such techniques had offered George W. ByDemocrats had not only matched Republicans in adopting commercial marketing techniques; they had moved ahead by integrating methods developed in the social sciences. That was the structure Obama had abandoned after winning the nomination in Instead, they fixated on trying to unlock one big, persistent mystery, which Lundry framed this way: TargetPoint also integrated content collected from newspaper websites and closed-caption transcripts of broadcast programs.
Ultimately, Lundry wanted to assess the impact that each type of public attention had on what mattered most to them: He turned to vector autoregression models, which equities traders use to isolate the influence of single variables on market movements. That informal conversation among political-class elites typically led to traditional print or broadcast press coverage one to two days later, and that, in turn, might have an impact on the horse race. Those insights offered campaign officials a theory of information flows, but they provided no guidance in how to allocate campaign resources in order to win the Electoral College.
The goal was to try to divine the calculations behind those decisions. In early September, as part of his standard review, Lundry noticed that the week after the Democratic convention, Obama had aired 68 ads in Dothan, Alabama, a town near the Florida border. Even though the area was known to savvy ad buyers as one of the places where a media market crosses state lines, Dothan TV stations reached only about 9, Florida voters, and around 7, of them had voted for John McCain in But they were advertising there.
Already the Obama campaign was known for its relentless e-mails beseeching supporters to give their money or time, but this one offered something that intrigued Davidsen: With Narwhal, e-mail blasts asking people to volunteer could take their past donation history into consideration, and the algorithms determining how much a supporter would be asked to contribute could be shaped by knowledge about his or her reaction to previous solicitations.
Now analysts could leverage personal data to identify the attributes of those who responded, and use that knowledge to refine subsequent appeals. Television and radio ads had to be purchased by geographic zone, and the available data on who watches which channels or shows, collected by research firms like Nielsen and Scarborough, often included little more than viewer age and gender.
How you knit that together is a challenge. But when it came to buying media, such calculations had been simply impossible, because campaigns were unable to link what they knew about voters to what cable providers knew about their customers.
Walsh says of the effort to reimagine the media-targeting process: It was to find out how many of our persuadable voters were watching those dayparts. For privacy reasons, however, the information was not available at the individual level. The Obama campaign had created its own television ratings system, a kind of Nielsen in which the only viewers who mattered were those not yet fully committed to a presidential candidate.
But Davidsen had to get the information into a practical form by early May, when Obama strategists planned to start running their anti-Romney ads. She oversaw the development of a software platform the Obama staff called the Optimizer, which broke the day into 96 quarter-hour segments and assessed which time slots across 60 channels offered the greatest number of persuadable targets per dollar. By September, she had unlocked an even richer trove of data: Sometimes a national cable ad was a better bargain than a large number of local buys in the 66 media markets reaching battleground states.
But the occasional national buy also had other benefits. They had invested in their own media-intelligence platform, called Centraforce.
It used some of the same aggregated data sources that were feeding into the Optimizer, and at times both seemed to send the campaigns to the same unlikely ad blocks—for example, in reruns on TV Land. The campaign had plenty of those, generated by a public-opinion team of eight outside firms, and new arrivals at the Chicago headquarters were shocked by the variegated breadth of the research that arrived on their desks daily.
The lead pollster, Joel Benenson, had respondents write about their experiences. A quartet of polling firms were assigned specific states and asked to figure out which national themes fit best with local concerns. But the campaign had to play defense, too. Simas would monitor Community conversations to see which news events penetrated voter consciousness. There were simply more undecided voters in such states—sometimes nearly twice as many as the traditional pollsters found.
A basic methodological distinction explained this discrepancy: The rivalry between the two units trying to measure public opinion grew intense: Green Bay was the only media market in the state to experience such a shift, and there was no obvious explanation.
By some estimates, half of younger voters do not have a landline or cannot be reached by cellphone. Three weeks before Election Day, the app was unveiled by the campaign and downloaded by 40, Romney supporters. There was only one problem. For months, he had worried that the Romney campaign would find a way to present its candidate in a compelling fashion.
But as far as Axelrod could tell, the Romney campaign had no such strategy. His governorship was important to him, but his signature achievement [health care] was unhelpful to them in the Republican primary. My feeling is you have to build a candidacy on the foundation of biography. That is what authenticates your message.
I was always waiting for that happen. Romney had been weakened by assaults from fellow GOP candidates during the primaries. Myers wondered if the Romney campaign should invest in a direct response. In campaign postmortems, Republicans have been criticized for spending too much on advertising compared with Democrats, even as some reports said Obama was able to book television spots more cheaply, run more ads in key states, and reach key voters more effectively.
As a result, Obama purchased ads on channels such as TV Land and Hallmark that were watched by voters who rarely saw news programs where ads often appear. Stevens said the criticism of the Romney ad strategy is misguided. When advertising by the campaigns is compared, he said, Obama spent twice as much as Romney. Instead, prime-time viewers saw Clint Eastwood pretending to talk to Obama in an empty chair.
He called it the Manhattan Project. So Romney proposed months of intense preparation, with 16 mock debates. That left the impression that Romney was referring not just to people on welfare but also to recipients of Social Security and veterans benefits.
His poll numbers plummeted. If the Manhattan Project was ever needed, it was now. Obama unprepared Obama played right into the strategy.
How Obama’s Team Used Big Data to Rally Voters - MIT Technology Review
After some lethargic rehearsals, in which Senator John F. Kerry of Massachusetts played the Romney role, Obama never mentioned the 47 percent controversy during the first debate. The president skipped at least two practice sessions at which he was going to review material. Obama seemed as unready as Romney was ready.
The Mitt Romney they saw in debates was articulate, thoughtful, and had a plan. Stevens, however, thought money for late advertising was important.
Why had Obama spent so heavily during the primaries when he had no primary opponent? In Florida, for example, the Romney campaign said it had fewer than staff members on the ground, a huge commitment of its total of nationwide. The significance of the fusion of Facebook and voter file data is hard to overemphasise. The messages can be honed to a particular demographic — age, gender, etc — as well as set of interests, and targeted on the most hotly contested parts of the most crucial battleground states.
Teddy Goff, the digital director of the re-election team, told Social Media Week that as the year progresses there would be more and more "persuasion through interaction". Individual voters would be given access to digital platforms from which they will be able to tell their own stories "and that's far more powerful than anything we can say", Goff said.
People's own stories really moves votes. An Obama message would be crafted so that "not only can it be passed to your friends but to those friends that we think are most in need of passing it on to". The bottom line is that if you are sent a message from your Facebook friend encouraging you to turn up to an event or donate to Obama, you are vastly more likely to respond than if the request comes from an anonymous campaign staffer. The other door that data integration will further open in is personalised marketing.
This has been the Holy Grail of political campaigners for decades: In the old world of snail mail, that could be achieved to some degree through direct marketing — ie leaflets dropped into the letter box — but that is expensive and far too slow with today's hour news cycle.
The fusion of information into a centralised database allows you to direct market online at much less cost and virtually instantaneously. The technique has begun to spread widely among commercial businesses over the past year, and it is only a matter of time before such hyper-targeting is standard across political campaigns.
Obama, Facebook and the power of friendship: the 2012 data election
Indeed, we've already started to see it this year. The Obama campaign has already tailored a single donation request to 26 distinct segments of the voting public. The Republicans are also getting in on the act. Michele Bachmann used customised online advertising in Iowa to reach Republican voters only, sending to their computers messages with a local spin for each of the state's 99 counties. That helped her win Iowa's vaunted straw poll in August though that didn't help her in the long run.
Rick Perry sent God-praising commercials to Iowans who listed themselves as evangelicals on Facebook. The company CampaignGridthat serves mainly Republican candidates, claims to be able to online market direct to targeted households. Jeff Dittus, the company's co-founder, illustrates what this means. He worked on behalf of one unidentified Republican presidential candidate, serving online ads in the Miami-Dade region of Florida specifically toindividuals who had voted in at least two of the four previous Republican primaries.
The adverts were further customised for gender, and for Spanish speaking. They were distributed to the individuals through internet ad exchanges that allow for instantaneous filtering of users the nanosecond they click onto a video on any one of four million websites. In that flash, if you fitted the criterion you were served with a second pre-roll video from the candidate delivering a message to you that you would have found remarkably personal.